Interview with József Kajdi – Episode 5

So my first six months were the equivalent of a nightmare. This was helped by the fact that I had 7 direct subordinates in the Ministry of Justice. Now I was immediately in charge of 540 people.

Plus, as I’ve been trying to point out, the tasks involved, the responsibility weighing on me, were an additional burden. This government, the Antall government, has been meeting every week. There was a cabinet meeting every Thursday.

Parliament has been in session continuously since the second of May. In the first summer, the MPs did not even go on holiday, but tried to pass all the bills that the government bombarded them with. Because, I stress once again, this government wanted to bring the process of regime changing to completion.

This also includes the public law aspect of regime changing, because although the most important laws were passed through during the National Round Table negotiations, we have, for example, inherited the socialist council system, which was a significant institution of the socialist system, and József Antall said that the change of public law will be completed once the institutional system of local democracy is established. He pushed at all costs for the adoption of the Municipality Act and the holding of local elections, which, by the way, several members of the government and even the MDF leadership warned against, because, as I said, the naïve expectation in society that there would be an immediate achievement of an Austrian standard of living turned out very quickly to be impossible, and so the human and social disappointment of the regime change was almost immediate. But I have also mentioned that we did not have all the information about the situation in the country, so when the Antall government came to power and we took office properly, and everyone sat down in their respective positions, we were faced with the fact that we had practically no information about the real economic situation.

In the Prime Minister’s Office, or rather, in the office of its predecessor, the Prime Minister’s Council of Ministers, there was a department headed by Péter Medgyessy, who was Deputy Prime Minister, an economic policy secretariat, who left the office by taking all the files, documents and floppy disks that existed. So György Matolcsy, who became State Secretary for Economic Policy during the Antal government and proceeded to take up this position and this task, found empty shelves and empty drawers. Ferenc Rabár, the new finance minister, went into the finance ministry without the former minister handing over the ministry, without handing over information.

He found empty shelves and empty files as well. So basically, I have to say that the first months were spent both in the ministry and in the government office trying to find out the real figures, the real facts about the economic situation in the country, including the National Bank. There, we had to replace the then Governor of the National Bank, Ferenc Bartha, quite quickly, who may take offence after heating this, but I have to say it anyway.

When the Antall government came to power, and while we were taking over the government, Ferenc Bartha was travelling around the world on a kind of international road show, which is a common thing anyway for National Bank governors, though they usually use these tours to borrow debt from other countries. But he used his travels instead, to tell everyone he met that they shouldn’t support this government, because it will fail very soon anyway.

Now, what we need to know is that the National Bank was, back then, a body with national powers, under the direct control of a government, and Bartha, as the leader of such an institution, was saying such things about the new government to Europe and the world. So József Antall, when he got hold of this, ordered him home and offered him the chance to resign himself, rather than sack him. József Antall was always a man of such fair gestures, and indeed Ferenc Barta asked for his dismissal, and that is when György Surányi, with whom József Antall and the democratic opposition had already been in contact, became the chairman of the Central Bank in the late summer of 1990.

He had been the state secretary of the National Planning Office before the formation of the Antall government, and we abolished the National Planning Office, and he essentially took over the head of the central bank and became the national bank president, enjoying the full confidence of József Antall. This is significant because later on, perhaps notoriously, he was not allowed to remain in that position. By the end of August, the picture of the country’s financial and economic situation was such that it was possible to give an account of the country’s situation on the basis of concrete information, and József Antall then asked for an hour-long slot on Hungarian television.

At that time, there were already new presidents of the two main branches of media, Csaba Gombár, president of Hungarian Radio, and Elemér Hankiss, president of Hungarian Television. They were appointed by the President of the Republic, at the suggestion of Csurka. And indeed, in his one-hour speech, József Antall essentially confronted society with the fact that they were at a very difficult time, he was making an almost Churchill-like speech.

In the sense that he said that, for several years, the economic situation here will mean very serious inflation, very serious austerity, but everything is needed to transform the socialist planned economy into essentially a capitalist market economy. Now this is the speech that Elemér Hankiss did not allow to be broadcast on Hungarian television. So here I would like to refer to the film that has been playing on Netflix and in cinemas in recent days or months, the film Blokád.

There, it’s played as if this speech had been made before the taxi blockade, it’s made at the end of August, but again, it’s banned. So Hungarian society was, essentially, unaware of the actual situation of the country. I am not saying that if this happened, there would have been no taxi blockade, but it is certain that Hungarian society wouldn’t have been so enthusiastic about siding with the taxi drivers who formed the blockade, because by then they would’ve been aware that, “yes, there will be very serious difficulties.”

So this speech also says what we, believe it or not, were already facing on May the 31st,  namely that the country’s fuel reserves, its oil reserves, were minimal. Since 31 May, there has hardly been a government meeting in which the government has not been concerned with trying to obtain oil from somewhere, because the country was receiving oil via the Friendship Pipeline, sometimes only in dribs and drabs, sometimes not at all, and that is why various plans were drawn up to obtain oil by road or by sea, because the country has an oil reserve of around 11 days, whereas a normal country, a Western European country, has a reserve of 110 days.

Yes, but oil could only be obtained for dollars, and the country did not have dollars. When we took over the government, the official data was that the foreign reserve was USD 800 million, which is basically almost nothing, but then it turned out that this is not true either, it is much less than that, and just when a certain interest repayment date was due to expire, the country had, by the period of the taxis blockade, about USD 400 million in foreign currency reserves, which is obviously nothing compared to what is needed.

But to return to the adoption of the Municipal Law, about which I repeat, many people were warning József Antall that he should wait until after the municipal elections, because there is such disillusionment in society that the MDF will certainly lose the elections. But József Antall decided that he doesn’t care. The public law system change must be completed and the local government system must be established, even at the cost of the MDF losing the election.

And the draft local government law put forward by the government was to be discussed and negotiated in a six-party conciliation so that, if possible, this two-thirds law, because it is a two-thirds law, can be passed as soon as possible. An agreement in principle is reached between the six parties, which the SZDSZ, however, breaks at the last minute and leaves the negotiating table. It was at this time that József Antall was on his first official trip abroad to Italy, as Prime Minister.

If I recall correctly, this was to attend the Pentagonnale Cooperation summit, It was a two- or three-days long meeting, and he didn’t take me with him, because he literally said: “Joseph, I’m not going to take you abroad with me,” and he, truly, never took me with him on his foreign trips, because, he said: “I’m calm and secure when you’re at home and holding the fort.” I was not a member of the government, but thank God I had been quasi-accepted by the members of the government as if I were the mouthpiece of József Antall, as if what I said was said by József Antall, the Prime Minister.

Imre Kónya, the leader of the MDF parliamentary group, came to me – I can’t remember the exact day – and said that there was a problem, that there will be no local government law because the SZDSZ has withdrawn from the agreement, and without their votes we would not have a two-thirds majority. What was the reason? It was a completely irrelevant reason, they simply got up from the negotiating table on some pretext. Yes, but at that time the President of the Republic was still an Interim President, and here I would like to refer back to the MDF-SZDSZ agreement, which I did not mention at the time, that in exchange for the SZDSZ agreeing to a reduction in the number of two-thirds cornerstone laws, we would have to pay a price.

The price was that the future President of the Republic had to be an SZDSZ politician. József Antall, in turn, got this SZDSZ politician to be named in the agreement, i.e. Árpád Göncz, and György Szabad was made the Speaker of the House.

By the way, according to the customary law of parliamentary democracies, the winning party always gives the President of Parliament, and gives the President of the Republic too. So here József Antall was making a very strong bargain and concession in the end, against customary law, but he is the one who chose the person for the job, Árpád Göncz, whom he has known very well since 56, and who knew him as a very honest writer, and trusted that Árpád Göncz will indeed hold this office in accordance with the constitution, representing national unity and standing above parties. So he fully supported this.

But then I get a call from József Antall in Italy, because we agreed to stay in touch, when he called me and found out that the SZDSZ has left the negotiating table and that what is very important to him, his law on the system of local government, was now in danger, he literally said to me, “Call Árpád, go to him and tell him the following. Make your party, I mean the SZDSZ, sit back down, make it find its way back to the previous agreement, because I tell you, there was already an agreement, an agreement in principle on the draft law, because if not, there will be a problem with the election of the President of the Republic.” It should be known that, at that time, it had already been decided by means of the 1989 referendum, that Parliament would elect the President of the Republic, for whose election, however, the MDF votes would be definitely needed, in accordance with the agreement.

I checked in with Uncle Árpi, with whom I have had personal contact on several occasions, since I personally took all the appointments to him and he signed them, and we were on a first-name basis. He told me, right on our first meeting, to call him Uncle Árpi. Somehow, my mouth couldn’t get used to it. In the four years I was there, I only called him Uncle Árpi once, and I’ll come back to that.

I always talked to him casually, but I always called him Mr. President. I checked in with him, and I even asked Antall on the phone if he wanted me to give him his orders verbatim, he said, “Yes, I insist that you give him my orders verbatim.” I told Árpád Göncz everything as instructed; pointing out that this could be a problem with the election of the President of the Republic.

I can honestly say that I have never seen the old man so upset, and quite rightly so. He started banging the table, saying that this was blackmail, that he was taking it personally, that he had nothing to do with his party, and that it was impossible to give and deliver such a message. I said that “You misunderstood, Mr President, this is not blackmail, but if the MDF members of parliament feel that your party, the SZDSZ, is backing out of an agreement, why should they feel obliged to abide by the MDF-SZDSZ agreement, the part about you being President of the Republic, and why they should vote for you.”

Unwaveringly, the President said that this was dirty blackmail and that he had nothing to do with his party. So I left, needless to say, Antall called me a few hours later and asked me what had happened at Árpád’s. So I told him that we had probably overstepped the mark, and I told him how our President had reacted to this message.

And Antall said, “It’s OK, Jóska, calm down, I asked you to give it to him literally, you’ll see, it will have results.” Indeed, the next day the SZDSZ returned to the negotiating table, the Local Government law was passed, local government elections were held, and Árpád Göncz became President of the Republic, so in the end all sides stuck to the previous agreement, and so Árpád Göncz became the actual President of the Republic. The not-so-very friendly relationship with the President later became even more tense, during the media war, but that is a later story.

I should say something about the media situation, because it is also a precursor of the media war, that when Elemér Hankiss, and Csaba Gombár were appointed by Árpád Göncz, and which appointment was proposed by Prime Minister József Antall, there was a cabinet meeting on that day, and I stress that it had very serious discussions. As I said, there was not a government meeting every week where we did not talk about getting oil from somewhere, because the amount of oil we had was alarming. And if you run out, you have to virtually shut down factories, hospitals, essentially putting the state into bankruptcy.

Another topic that was constantly brought up was the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The withdrawal itself did start already, the first Soviet military convoys left Hungary as early as 1989, but the Soviets made a very serious demand during the negotiations.

They were demanding that “Okay, fine, we’ll leave, but in return the Hungarian state will compensate and pay us 50 billion forints.” Of course, one, that amount was larger than our budget, and two, József Antal said that this was out of the question, because between 55 and 57, including the military intervention in ‘56, Soviet troops were illegally occupying Hungarian territory.

So there was no legal basis for them to be here. And in essence, the damage in ’56 was the result of a completely illegal stay anyway. And the basis for this is that the Second World War was concluded in such a way that the Soviet troops could legally remain in Hungary until Austria was granted neutrality.

That happened at some point during 1955. They would then have been obliged to leave Hungary, but they did not. And in essence they intervened in the suppression of the 56th revolution with force, while illegally present in the country.

József Antall played this as a trump card in the negotiations. And Antal Annus, the deputy chief of staff, who negotiated with the Soviet negotiating delegation as a government official, regularly emphasized this. And we had another trump card, the environmental damage caused here, because there was a great deal of environmental reconstruction that had to be carried out on all the properties left here by the Russians, or more precisely, by the Soviet troops.

Like Thököl, and other places, or even just think of the Gödöllő castle, whose most beautiful halls were used as stables, and left in a terrible state for the Hungarian side. Negotiations were very difficult, which is why I say that this was also an off-agenda topic at every government meeting, to see how far the negotiations will go and how they can be continued. The ultimate goal of the Hungarian side was to negotiate a zero-sum deal.

So the Soviets were demanding this 50 billion HUF, and we were saying that we would not pay it, that they should pay it instead, and that we should then agree to a zero balance. You do not pay, we do not pay. The Soviets didn’t want to go along with this, partly because they couldn’t really provide accommodation for the withdrawn troops, they were forced to house Soviet military officers in forests and tents, and one of their arguments were that the Czechs and the Germans were paying them, for precisely this reason, so that they can erect buildings and I don’t know what else.

Joseph Antall, on the other hand, hardened himself and said no. So we had to negotiate in such a way that the final result was a break-even result. Afterwards, there was a negotiation at the highest level, where the Prime Minister was negotiating with the highest Soviet negotiating delegation, where Antall pithily remarked that “you gentlemen have made the mistake of occupying the whole of Hungary, unlike in Germany, which was split up, if you only occupied a part of Hungary, the other part that did not fall under your control could pay you this compensation if full.”

Since you have occupied the whole of Hungary and have been here for 43 years, there is unfortunately no way of doing so, because the state of the country does not make it possible. So, coming back to the government meetings, I must say that the very first government meetings, and this means for about a year and a half, started at 10 a.m. on Thursday mornings and often ended at 2.00 or 3.00 a.m. on Fridays.

So they were terribly long. This was partly due not only to the sheer volume of work that we had to do, because we usually had 25 to 30 daily topics of discussion, and not just any daily topics, but very serious ones, and also, unfortunately, this length could also be attributed to the fact that we were amateurs, let’s admit it. The ministers had never actually seen public administration up close, and I was an amateur too, I must admit, because, as I said, I had no serious management experience either.

But we were also amateurs in the sense that we were not aware of and were not prepared for a completely different way of operating an administration, a continuous parliamentary operation, a continuous government operation, and as a result, some of the preparatory materials for decisions were not prepared adequately, and some of them were prepared in a completely partisan manner, with György Matolcsy leading the way, with proposals pulled out of his pocket, which had to be read on the spot and decisions had to be taken spontaneously and immediately. In addition, as a result of this, a very serious personal conflict developed between Ferenc Rabár, Minister of Finance, and György Matolcsy, State Secretary for Economic Policy. By the way, Gyuri was the secretary of the economic cabinet, and he regularly pretended that he did not clash with the economic ministers at the economic cabinet meeting, but allowed a decision to be taken there, in return for which he pulled out of his pocket a proposal at the government meeting that was completely at odds with it, and in doing so provoked a debate that had already been settled and decided in front of the economic cabinet, but then it was restarted, because, I repeat, a completely opposite position was put on the agenda.

The truth is that Gyuri, and his supporters, like Béla Kádár, did not think in terms of austerity regarding the economic system change, but in terms of an economic policy that was rather explicitly forced, one that pushed for aggressive economic growth. Ferenc Rabár, on the other hand, was clearly in favor of a restrictive economic policy, and in this he found a partner in György Surányi, the President of the Central Bank, and very often, serious economic policy debates occurred between these two groups, sometimes even including personal animosity. Moreover, it was led by a prime minister who was not an economist, so he was sometimes just scratching his head and was therefore very often angry as to why this was not being decided in the economic cabinet.

The economic cabinet was formed very quickly, as a decision-preparatory body, with the participation of the ministers for economic affairs, i.e. the ministers for industry and trade, finance, international economic relations, and György Matolcsy, which was later expanded to include the ministers for labor and transport, so with the exception of the humanities, these were also added later, plus the minister for agriculture. As I said, unfortunately, the preparation of decisions was very amateurish at the beginning, and that is why cabinet meetings were very long, and another thing played a role in this. József Antall pushed the coalition talks onto the cabinet meetings, especially at the beginning.

If you think about it, every party leader of the coalition was also a member of the cabinet. Laci Súrján, as Minister of the People’s Economy and President of the Christian Democratic People’s Party, sat in the cabinet. Ferenc József Nagy, Minister of Agriculture, President of the Smallholders’ Party, also sat in the cabinet.

József Antall was deliberately provoking them, from a party political side, so that decisions were made in such a way that they were not only a government decision but also a coalition decision, because when they comment and vote on a decision, if it passes, it also means that the Christian Democratic People’s Party and the Smallholders’ Party agree with the government decision that has been made. So there is no need for a separate coalition agreement. That is why he allowed ministers to speak at length, to make several statements, even as politicians, not just as leaders of their respective portfolios.

And thanks to this, once a decision was taken, it was insisted upon, that everyone adheres to it. Whether he is a minister, or the leader of a coalition party, he cannot challenge the government’s decision afterwards, even if he may have had a different opinion before, because the decision has been taken. Another peculiarity is that in these cases there is usually a vote.

The Prime Minister, however, did not vote. He only voted, and even then it was very rare, when there was a tie. Even then, he preferred to say “let’s discuss it further and let one team win over the other.”

So he let it conclude without him voting, he also always said that his vote was in favor of the majority vote. So he voted on very rare occasions only, on purpose It is another matter that when it came to an agenda item that was politically very important to him, unlike other government agendas, where he always spoke at the end and summarized the outcome of the debate, in these cases, he spoke first and tried to steer and lead the debate in such a way that his position prevailed as much as possible.

So the Prime Minister’s primacy did play its intended role, but I would like to emphasize that this was not forced. He never abused his position under constitutional law, that he is the “first among equals, and that everyone’s existence and fate depends on him.” Government sessions, I repeat, were very long.

Ministers found it very difficult. That is why, for example, he allowed himself some humor after a certain period of time, like when he said:” I see that the division of labor within the government is finally prevailing, because the ministers that are sleeping are different than last time.” So he made such stinging remarks from time to time.

Overall, he had a great sense of humor. Specifically a kind of sarcastic humor, which usually materialized most visibly in closed meetings, either in staff meetings or at cabinet meetings. Anyway, the way József Antall worked was that he usually came in at about 8:45-9:00.

Until then, he would read the daily press in the car, come in, and during the day he would usually perform the duties associated with the Prime Minister’s function, either leading a cabinet meeting or sitting in parliament. And he usually had his closest, key staff members which included me, to show up at 8 o’clock. This included the Chief of Cabinet, his deputy, the other deputy and the head of the secretariat, and later the spokesman as well, at our suggestion, who was first Balázs László and later Judit Juhász.

And we had to watch the TV newsreel, at that time it was still on the State Television at 8 o’clock. In the meanwhile he ate dinner, commenting on the news, both domestic and foreign policy news. Afterwards we discussed what had happened that day and what the next day would bring.

And afterwards, usually at half past nine or ten, he would split up the crew and say that we could go home, but he always added: “Jóska, you stay”. This applied to me, and as a result, I stayed with him until midnight, half past midnight, because I had to wait for the programme “Napzárta” (Day’s End), which was, to put it mildly, an opposition-controlled programme at the time.

I had to sit by the phone and if I heard something on the programme that I deemed wrong, I had to correct it immediately and call into the programme. But I can honestly say that, while I had two small children, actually, three small children from September ’91 onwards, at home with my wife, I still enjoyed those personal conversations at night.

For he told me a great deal about his life, from his childhood onwards. I would be lying if I said that I was his adviser, although he did share very confidential government decisions and ideas with me. I was more of a listener.

It’s another matter that he was always watching my reaction, and if he noticed that I had an opinion about something, he would immediately say, “Go ahead.” It’s another matter if he took my opinion as advice, or didn’t. So that’s why I say I was not his adviser,more like his listening audience, with whom he shared his most confidential things.

But let’s go back to the media thing, because that’s a very important part of the Antall period. So, as I said, Hankiss and Gombár were appointed while there was a cabinet meeting ongoing. József Antall, asked me, since he has made the appointment, or at the very least, the appointment was made on his recommendation, to send the two gentlemen over to him, because he would like to congratulate them.

By “sending them over to him”, I mean that Árpád Göncz was sitting on the Metro side of the Parliament, where his office was. And the Prime Minister’s section was at the far end of the Parliament, at Gate 17. So you actually had to walk through quite a long corridor to the Prime Minister.

I interrupted the cabinet meeting, we went into the Prime Minister’s room, where it turned out to me that Elemér Hankiss had to be an old acquaintance of the PM, because they greeted each other with “Hello Jóska”, “Hello Elemér”. With Gombár however, he had a more formal greeting, because they said “good afternoon” to each other while shaking hands. 

We sat down on either side of the oval table, where Elemér, in his usual style, started to babble a little in his usual tone of voice, like a good acquaintance, in front of an old friend, and suddenly he said, “Tell us, Jóska, what do you expect from us? “And Antall was surprised, and didn’t answer anything, so Hankiss repeated again, “Well, here we are between four eyes, okay, technically, eight, but face-to-face really, so you can tell us what you expect from us.” That’s when we all realized that he meant that “now is the part where you ask us to support the administration”, or whatever.

József Antall said the following: „Look, Elemér, I expect you to say only objective things. If we’re doing something wrong, say so, but if we’re doing things right, say so.”

And the two gentlemen were obviously shocked, because they didn’t expect this, they expected the Prime Minister to play friendly with them. Nothing of the sort happened, József Antall thanked them and said that “No offense, but I’ve got a cabinet meeting to attend.” Then he shook hands with the two gentlemen still under shock, said goodbye, and left. Yes, but then József Antall was confronted with the fact that anything the government did wrong, or was perceived to be doing wrong, was broadcast on Hungarian television and public radio.

If something good happened, it was not. This understandably bothered him, and sometimes he even tried to remind the two presidents that “this is not what we agreed to, and I would’ve also expected something positive to be said about the government’s actions”, because certain things did happen, such as the termination of the Warsaw Pact or the KGST, both of which were terminated by Hungarian proposal. For example, the termination of the Warsaw Treaty Organization is a very interesting story, unfortunately the film “Blockade” does not deal with the scene which I think could have been a very spectacular and interesting addition.

The last meeting of the Political Consultative Council of the Warsaw Treaty took place on 7 June 1990. We didn’t know this at the time, but it was the last meeting, where the member states were represented at the highest level, including Hungary, with the interim President of the Republic, Árpád Göncz, and the Prime Minister, József Antall, and the Foreign Minister, who was supposed to represent Hungary, but who was at an international conference in Copenhagen, and then signed some international treaty in Paris, Ferenc Somogyi, the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, would take his place in this meeting, and Lajos Für was also there as Minister of Defense, because the Soviets have taken the initiative to hold a two-sided meeting the following day, which dealt partly with troop withdrawal and partly with economic issues, and that is why Gyuri Matolcsy was also a member of the delegation. And on a rotating basis, the heads of each negotiating delegation chaired the meeting.

József Antall went out with a negotiating resolution. The official negotiating proposal was to reform the Warsaw Pact, while the Hungarian proposal for resolution was not to reform the Warsaw Pact, but to terminate it. And we were trying to get the Poles and the Czechs, Havel and Walesa, to be our partners in this.

The Czechs were supporting us initially, more or less, but when it came to deciding what the formal proposal for a resolution should be, they too backed down. However, as fate would have it, on the last day, the chairman was József Antall, the representative of Hungary, who had the official draft resolution in front of him, which the foreign ministers have already approved and which he was supposed to read out, but next to that on the table was the rejected Hungarian draft resolution, and he decided not to read out the official one, but the Hungarian draft resolution. He read it out, then there was a shocked silence in the Chamber.

He thought that if there was a big scandal, he’d simply say, “I’m sorry, I made a mistake, because I had the two papers in front of me and I got them mixed up.” Everyone looked at Gorbachev. I emphasize once more, the air in the room stopped, and Gorbachev said “Da, khoroso” (Yes, fine).

And that’s essentially when the series of negotiations for the termination of the Warsaw Treaty started, which then happened a year later, and the Warsaw Treaty was liquidated. Antall later told me that he didn’t know whether Gorbachev was asleep or not paying attention or whether he had actually nodded knowingly and said yes, okay. This, let’s say, is a historically irrelevant statement of approval. What’s important is that this was essentially the first nail in the coffin of the Warsaw Treaty, as is said in the film Blockade as well.

But Hungary was also the initiator of the dissolution of the KGST. Now, all this was not actually broadcast on Hungarian public television and Hungarian radio at the time. So the Hungarian society was not confronted with the fact that Hungary is taking a significant historical step that everyone, at least the majority of the country or the majority of the population in Hungary, has been waiting for, for a very long time.

But there are other things that could be said that were ignored by the media. József Antall was understandably irritated and disturbed by this. That is why, in addition, there was another conflict that was developing, in connection with the Hungarian media situation.

It should be known that there is no media law in place during this time,  thanks to the activities of Miklós Haraszti at the round table negotiations, and that is why a new law, a media law, was being drafted, which the government said was “a contribution to changing the usual legislative agenda. It is not the government that will draft the law, instead, a sub-committee composed of MPs will be set up, we will provide the technical assistance, the Ministry of Justice will provide a colleague as a codifier, and this sub-committee will draft the new media law as they want to draft it.”  They had worked on it for more than two and a half years, and in the end it is probably common knowledge that this draft media law failed, and did not show any results, and that it didn’t get a single ‘yes’ vote because when Antall felt that the opposition was not on board, the government MPs, at Antall’s request, held back on the vote, and this law essentially failed with 0 ‘yes’ votes.

Yes, but the background to this is that Elemér Hankiss accepted a six-month teaching fellowship in the US, and without telling the government, or informing it, he travelled to the US and appointed Bányai as presidential intendant,  a prominent personality on television at the time, who was known to have very close political ties to the SZDSZ. Now there are two problems with this whole sequence of events. The first is that at that time Hungarian Television and Hungarian Radio were both national bodies back then.

So they were under direct government control, and the only way to go on leave as a leader is to ask permission and report to the prime minister. Elemér Hankiss failed to do this. I say, he was already out in America when we learned that he had left Hungarian Television for six months, and what appointment he had made.

The other problem is not only the person of Bányai himself, but also the fact that there was no such position in the rules of organization and operation of Hungarian Television, as Intendant. So he appointed someone to a position, with full presidential powers, that does not exist. We reported this to Elemér Hankiss, who we ordered home from America, and who was, of course, deeply offended by this, and demanded to know how we dared to do such a thing.

Of course, it was up to me to report this good news. Nevertheless, he came home, we started a discussion on the rules of organization and operation, and we tried to persuade him to have vice-presidents, so we drew up the rules of organization and operation with him and the TV people, and Joseph Antall proposed the appointment of three vice-presidents, one of whom was Bányai. So he even made that gesture. 

Vitrai would be the second, and Alajos Chrudinák the third. However, Árpád Göncz refused to accept and sign the appointments, while according to the constitution this is something that is subject to the Prime Minister’s signature. I don’t want to give a lecture on public law, but it should be known that in the case of a personal proposal, which is, moreover, subject to signature by the proposing nominator, the President of the Republic has one task: to sign the appointment.

Árpád Göncz, however, did not do this, and this is essentially the first public act in the development of the media war, which later triggers a process that completely destroys the friendly relationship between the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic. In the meantime, however, there are also events, such as József Antall’s idea of a Visegrád three-party cooperation agreement within the framework of the historic Visegrád cooperation between Czechoslovakia, then Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, which would be signed at a ceremony in Visegrád. Árpád Göncz’s advisers began to wonder why it is not Árpád Göncz who would sign it on behalf of Hungary, when Havel and Valensa, his two presidential counterparts, did receive this honor, forgetting that the two other countries have completely different constitutional arrangements.

In Hungary the head of the executive is the Prime Minister, not the President of the Republic. The constitutional position of the President of the Republic is, and I am going to be very harsh, is that of a ceremonial puppet, a figurehead. Someone with very weak presidential powers, because almost everything is subject to counter-signature by a minister or the prime minister, and the president of the republic has almost no independent powers.

It is therefore obvious that this international act of public law must be signed by the Prime Minister, the head of the executive branch of government. However, I would say that the President of the Republic was being pushed around a little bit in the background in order to protest against this. He also took a small step in this direction, because it should also be known that József Antall was not a lawyer, while Árpád Göncz did have a law degree.

So he had a legal affinity with the matter. To his credit, he was not really pushing for this, while the daily press was making huge waves about József Antall, the Prime Minister, humiliating the President of the Republic, so they were trying to create even greater conflict between the two public dignitaries. József Antall defused the situation by inventing a commemorative document, a memorandum, to be signed by the President of the Republic on behalf of the Hungarian side, in addition to the official agreement, and Árpád Göncz was very happy to sign it.

So, in practice, I must say that this conflict was resolved peacefully, while, I must emphasise once again, there were very strong feelings being stirred up by the media and the press.